Battle of Britain diary

[stona]

Monday 19th August

A cloudy day with showers in the east.

Today both sides took stock.

According to its own figures the Luftwaffe had lost 246 fighters and 298 bombers since 8th August. However well it thought it was doing against the British, this was clearly not sustainable. Goering gathered his senior officers for a conference at Karinhall. A series of directives resulted, most notable that operations using the Ju 87 were to cease immediately. The time to cross the Channel from Cherbourg was giving the RAF too much time to react. Most of the fighters in this area would be moved from Luftflotte 3 to Luftflotte 2 in the Pas de Calais. Luftflotte 3’s twin engine bombers would henceforth fly at night. Losses of senior officers were mounting and consequently no more than one would fly on subsequent raids. Goering sent a message to bomber units. I can’t reproduce the entire text here, but I would like to dispel one myth. Here is the third paragraph.

“Only a part of the fighter escort will be provided to the bombers as close escort. The goal must be to employ as many free ranging fighters (Freijagd) as possible, so that they can simultaneously protect the bombers and intercept enemy fighters under favourable conditions. For such operations there can be no rigid plan, their execution depends on both enemy tactics and weather.”

My bold.
It was the bomber leaders who asked for close escort. Goering was a fighter pilot and understood that tying his fighters rigidly to the bomber formations would place them at a disadvantage. He never ordered any such thing. The reason this myth has passed into the common understanding of the Battle is because it was promoted after the war by certain Luftwaffe fighter leaders in an effort to deflect blame for their own failures onto a now dead Goering. It has subsequently gained credibility by repetition. I just read it in an otherwise excellent account of the Battle by Patrick Bishop, published in 2009, along with another myth, that Bf 110s would be escorted by Bf 109s. Only the bomb carrying fighter bomber (‘Jabo’) Bf 110s were escorted this way and it was not something new as of today.

Fighter Command also took stock. Since August 8th it had written off 54 Spitfires and 121 Hurricanes with many more damaged. The supply of aircraft was not a concern, but in the same period 94 pilots had been killed (or were missing) with another 60 badly enough wounded that they were no longer operational. On 17 August Fighter Command was 350 operational pilots short of its full strength of 1,300. Park also sent instructions to his controllers in 11 Group. Again, I can’t reproduce them here, but they asked them to engage enemy formations over land or within gliding distance of the coast (‘we cannot afford to lose pilots through forced landings in the sea’.) He wanted just pairs of aircraft sent out after reconnaissance aircraft. He also suggested that once an enemy formation had crossed the coast heading for the airfields, a Sector Training Flight or even No. 1 (Canadian) and No. 303 (Polish) Squadrons could be used to patrol below the clouds over the airfields. This, despite the fact that these were not operational units at the time.

There was little action today as both combatant air forces licked their wounds.

At 14.49 four Spitfires of No 602 Squadron chased a Ju 88 from 7./KG 51 and shot it down into the sea off Bognor, immediately ignoring Park’s advice. P/O H W Moody was shot down by return fire from the bomber, managing to bale out over land near North Bersted, West Sussex. He was burned and had splinters in his left thigh but made it back to his squadron at the end of the month.

At 18.45 six Spitfires, three each from Nos. 19 and 66 Squadrons set off after a Do 17 of 7./KG2 off the coast of Aldeburgh. The Dornier was shot down but P/O J A P Studd of 66 Squadron abandoned his Spitfire south of Orfordness. He was recovered by the Aldeburgh lifeboat but had drowned.

At the end of today the Luftwaffe had lost 3 aircraft with another damaged. The RAF had lost 4 of its fighters with another damaged.

Following the events of ‘the hardest day’ and those of the previous weeks, the first cracks began to appear in Luftwaffe morale. There was a feeling among the Luftwaffe's pilots that they were not winning, and that the Fighter Command being met over the skies of Britain was not the same as the one described in intelligence briefings. The RAF seemed as strong, or stronger than ever. Obltn Hahn of I./JG3 recorded that

‘utter exhaustion had set in. For the first time pilots discussed the prospects of being posted to a quieter sector’.

Some cases of Kanalkrankheit (Channel sickness) began to appear. Ulrich Steinhilper described the symptoms and the creative ‘cure’ developed by the Luftwaffe’s doctors.

‘At first there were isolated cases but, as the battle dragged on, there were more and more cases of the evil disease. The symptoms were many and various but usually surfaced in stomach cramps and vomiting, loss of appetite and consequently weight and acute irritability. Typically the patients consumption of alcohol and cigarettes would increase and he would show more and more signs of exhaustion…The principle of battle fatigue had not yet been established and it was felt that as soon as anyone was taken out of the line because he was showing signs of stress, there would be a flood. So, the doctors resorted to a diagnosis of appendicitis. This minor operation ensured that at least a pilot would not be flying for two or three weeks.’

The British pilots too were exhausted and stressed (though they kept any such feelings to themselves). Fighter Command squadrons were still rotating in and out of 10 and 11 Groups, a luxury not afforded to their German opponents. Today, for example, No.616 Squadron, based in 12 Group and which in the words of P/O Lionel Casson had ‘chased about after a few reconnaissance jobs and enjoyed great success during the ‘Junkers Party’ off Flamborough Head a few days ago’ replaced No 64 Squadron at Kenley. No 64 Squadron flew north to Leconfield for a well earned respite.

The British had no way of knowing how well they were doing, being more concerned with their own losses in what had become a battle of attrition.

[stona]

Tuesday 20 August.

Fine over the Channel at first but cloud and rain spreading from the north.

The first action of the day occurred of Lowestoft, when 6 Spitfires of No. 66 Squadron intercepted 3 Bf 110s of Epgr 210 who were looking for shipping to attack, shooting one down into the sea with the loss of its crew. P/O Cooke later remembered

“the rear gunner firing continually during the whole of the descent from 10,000-12,000 ft. down to sea level when it finally ditched. I was much impressed by the actions of the German crew. One at least of the crew, I think the pilot, escaped from the a/c and started to swim, in what direction neither he nor I could know precisely, but as I flew over him he looked up and shook his fist at me! I reported by radio and rescue services were alerted, but neither a/c nor crew were found. They were a brave crew. I admit I was impressed and sorry they could not be saved. I would like to record my admiration for the bravery of the enemy crew”

At about 14.45 a force estimated at 80+ was picked up over Calais and by the time the raid crossed the coast south of Margate this had been revised to ‘190’ aircraft. In fact, it comprised 30 Do 17s with an escort of 20 Bf 109s. The raid made its way along the north Kent coast towards the Canterbury area, leading the British to believe that Eastchurch was again the target. 12 Spitfires from No. 65 Squadron were despatched with 21 Hurricanes from Nos. 9 and 12 Squadrons. A Do 17 and a Bf 109 were shot down, 1 of the 65 Squadron Spitfires made a forced landing on Havengore Island (Foulness) with an engine damaged in combat by a Bf 109. Oddly, no bombs were reported to have been dropped.

A notable event today was the first victory by one of the Polish squadrons. No. 303 would claim the glory when it became operational, but today a Ju 88 of 8./KG 30 was shot down by a section of No 302 (Polish) Squadron near Hull. Green Section comprised S/Ldr W A J Satchell, P/O S Wapniarek and F/Lt Jastrzebski and the victory was shared by the first two, Jastrzebski manoeuvred to make his attack but lost the Junkers in cloud and never opened fire. The pilot of this aircraft, Uffz Franz-Georg Wolff, made a forced landing after one engine was stopped and a fire started in the cockpit, he also hoped to save two badly wounded crew men. Unfortunately, both injured men died of their wounds (on 21st and 22nd).

Here is a picture of the first ‘Polish’ victim of the Battle of Britain, burnt out at Patrington, near Hull.



At the end of today the Luftwaffe had lost 6 aircraft with 2 more damaged. The RAF lost 2 fighters with 2 more damaged.

[AlanG]

August 20 1940

Churchill addresses the House of Commons with his now famous speech;

"The gratitude of every home in our island, in our Empire, and indeed throughout the world, except in the abodes of the guilty, goes out to the British airmen who, undaunted by odds, unwearied in their constant challenge and mortal danger, are turning the tide of world war by their prowess and their devotion. Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few"

[Tim Marlow]

Hi Alan, famous perhaps, but surely not infamous?

[AlanG]

Correct.... edited

[JR]

Found this small report on the losses of ground crew .
In total, some 312 RAF personnel were killed on the ground during the Battle of Britain and another 467 injured. When considered against the toll of some 535 RAF aircrew killed during the battle, it will be seen that the loss of life and of injury on the ground was indeed significant. To the aircrew went the glory. Of the unsung ground crew, however, it should always be remembered: they also served.

[AlanG]

Groundcrew are always the forgotten people. They still are to this day.

Rigger for life!

[stona]

Wednesday 21 August

Cloudy but with clear spells and intermittent rain across the country

Today saw a change in Luftwaffe tactics, with many raids flown either by single aircraft or pairs of aircraft around the south and east coasts of Britain. About 200 aircraft were plotted but few ventured more than twenty miles inland.

Typical of today’s action was the shooting down of a Ju 88 of 4./KG 54 by the Hurricanes of Blue Section, B Flight of No. 17 Squadron whose three pilots, S/Ldr C W Williams, P/) J K Ross and P/O H A C Bird-Wilson would share the victory.

The Section had been ordered off at 15.45 to patrol the aerodrome (Tangmere) below the cloud at 5,000 feet. It was then vectored to Worthing and on its way back spotted the Ju 88 flown by Ofw. Heinz Apollony. In the subsequent action the Ju 88, B3+BM, was shot down, making a food forced landing at Earnley in West Sussex. Here is the aircraft with everybody posing for posterity.




Ofw. Heinz Apollony gave the following account when interrogated by the British.

“The briefing was to cross the British coast at Brighton, change course to London, from there change course to Bristol, change course to Southampton to drop high explosives and incendiaries on the Spitfire factory. Weather was supposed to be 8/10ths at 4,500m. This would have been ideal weather for our mission but the moment we crossed the British coast, there were clear blue skies.

We decided not to fly the full course but to dive into Southampton and get out as fast as possible. However my Bordfunker must have been asleep, because I saw the Hurricanes before he did and they were already diving towards us. All I could do was dump fuel which momentarily stopped the attack and gave me time to release the bombs which fell into fields. Now I tried to out manoeuvre the Hurricanes to get back into the clouds over the Channel which I did successfully but the damage to the plane was too severe, both engines were overheating and losing power quickly whilst the dinghy was hanging in shreds behind the tail. It was therefore impossible to reach France.

I dropped out of the clouds again, I knew the Hurricanes would be waiting so the moment we came out I released the canopy to show the pilots that I was helpless and wanted to give up. This they accepted and stopped firing. Seeing a big enough field for an emergency landing, I came in for a good belly landing. Three minutes later we were taken prisoner.”

Apollony seems to believe he managed to surrender in the air, but none of the 17 Squadron reports make any mention of this, or the fuel dumping. It seems more likely that they ceased firing when it became obvious that Apollony was attempting to land.

Here is a picture of the rather dapper looking observer Hptm Lothar Maiwald being marched into captivity with his pilot, the slightly dishevelled Ofw Heinz Apollony following. Maiwald considerably outranked his pilot. Not shown are the apparently sleepy bordfunker, Uffz Kurt Miethner who failed to spot the attacking Hurricanes, or the flight engineer Uffz Helmut Hempel, both of whom also survived to become P/Ws.



Is it me or does Apollony look glad to be out of it?

At the end of the day the RAF had lost 3 aircraft, including 2 in the bombing of St Eval and had 7 damaged. The Luftwaffe had lost 13 aircraft with another damaged.

[Tim Marlow]

Another interesting day Steve. To me they both look glad to be out of it, though I suppose they could both just be relieved they are alive. What strikes me from these is the weather. The superficial impression of the weather at the time was wall to wall sunshine with waves of bombers day after day......your accounts show how different, and much more complex, it really was.

[stona]

The weather was, well, typically English. I haven't specifically looked up temperatures, but June and August were both typical months, with slightly below average rainfalls. July 1940 was very wet, with almost double average rainfall, but September was very dry. The weather was not unduly warm, certainly no shirtsleeve order. In that picture of Maiwald and Apollony you can see that it has been raining if you look closely at the ground. Nobody is casting much of a shadow. In the first picture, the boy standing at the front of the aircraft with a dog might be wearing shorts, as all boys at the time did, but he is also wearing a jacket and tie as everyone mugs for the camera. Unfortunately the Meteorological Magazine suspended publication from July 1940 until after the war, so the best source for detailed information is not available.

The Luftwaffe was trying different tactics because it knew that its losses were unsustainable, particularly given the requirement to retain its strength for future operations. One with which many are familiar, relatively small numbers of bombers escorted by huge formations of fighters, some of which would make sweeps in an effort to confuse British RDF and/or draw off British fighters, would be coming soon!
The pace of operations was dictated by both the weather and the operational state of aircraft and crews. The Luftwaffe simply couldn't mount large scale operations with hundreds of aircraft everyday, anymore than Bomber Command would later in the war. This was another advantage for the side on the defensive. It allowed the British to replenish supplies, rest at least some aircrew (though many were flying patrols at least once a day even on the quietest days), and make repairs to damaged infrastructure.

The Luftwaffe's scatter gun approach was the result of uncoordinated planning and vague objectives. With better intelligence it could have maintained pressure on a few vital targets for a period of several days and done a lot better in its campaign. With hindsight I might even be able to win it for them :smiling3:

[stona]

Thursday 22 August.

The weather today is summed up in three words, cloud, wind and rain.

At 13.15 the two Bf 110 Staffeln of Epgr 210, escorted by 20 Bf 109s attempt an attack on convoy Totem, off South Foreland between Deal and Dover, which was already being shelled by coastal batteries at Cap Gris Nez. Nos. 54, 615 and 610 Squadrons were despatched and the raid was turned back at the cost of 2 Spitfires shot down and a Hurricane damaged.

Unteroffizier Ernst Glaeske and his Bordfunker Konrad Schwede had a lucky escape on this operation when they formated on what Glaeske took for a Bf 109 only to find that it was a Spitfire, which promptly shot up his starboard engine. He managed to escape in cloud and returned to Calais-Marck on one engine.

15.30 and a Ju 88 making a reconnaissance flight over targets in the south west was shot down into the sea off Exmouth by 2 Hurricanes of No. 213 Squadron.

15.35 and another Ju 88 making a reconnaissance flight over the south west was shot down near Beaford, Devon, by 3 Spitfires of No. 152 Squadron. 1 Spitfire was damaged by return fire.

19.00-19.45 and a raid of 20 Do 17s escorted by 20 Bf 109s provided cover for Eprg 210 to make another attack on Manston. Manston was damaged again by an estimated 7 bombs but there were no casualties on the ground. By now the airfield personnel had become adept at taking cover from incoming raids. The RAF lost two Spitfires with three others damaged.

Today saw the rather unsavoury story of the loss of Sgt M Keymer. He either crashed or abandoned his aircraft near Bazinghen on the French coast, severely injuring himself in the process. His casualty file, compiled in August 1946, notes that the official German story was that the pilot was shot in the head in combat before he ‘fell out’ of his aircraft. Local eyewitnesses reported that the badly injured Keymer was shot in the head by a German officer, he was 24 years old.

At the end of today the RAF had lost 4 fighters with another 6 damaged. The Luftwaffe had a good day, losing just 2 aircraft on operations against Britain.

[stona]

Friday 23 August

Variable weather, cloudy but with some bright spells inland.

Today was another quiet day but there was a storm brewing. The Luftwaffe sent single aircraft to bomb selected targets and flew the usual reconnaissance flights. In an illustration of how widespread Luftwaffe operations were, the first action of the day took place at 09.10 when 3 Hurricanes of No. 232 Squadron shot down an He 111 of Wekusta I/Ob.d.L which as the unit name suggests was on a weather reconnaissance flight. The He 111 went into the sea of Fair Isle, which, famous for its jumpers, is a speck of land between the main Orkney Islands and the Shetland Islands. One of the Hurricanes was damaged by return fire but made it back to base at Sumburgh in the Shetlands.

The only other Luftwaffe aircraft shot down over Britain was a Do 17 of Stab KG 2, on its way to bomb the Coventry Ordnance Works. It was shot down by anti-aircraft fire, making a good forced landing near Wickhambrook in Suffolk.

Today more than 30 civilians were killed in air raids, mostly carried out by single aircraft but Fighter Command lost no aircraft or personnel, just 3 aircraft were damaged on operations. In other RAF operations today, No 142 Squadron lost 4 of its Battle’s bombing E-Boats at Boulogne, 2 crashed into the sea and another 2 made it back to crash land at Eastchurch, where the squadron was based, and Ashford.

The Luftwaffe lost the two aircraft mentioned and another failed to return from a sortie over Britain (cause unknown, it doesn’t match any British claims). Another 4 returned damaged.

[stona]

Deleted...wrong day

[stona]

Saturday 24 August.

Similar weather to yesterday but cloudy off the coasts.

The Luftwaffe had regathered its forces and a new assault was launched today.

08.00 and RDF picked up the first German formations over Cap Gris Nez. Nos 610 and 85 Squadrons intercepted the first raid, 12 Ju 88s escorted by 20 Bf 109s. 1 Spitfire was shot down, a Defiant damaged and another Hurricane damaged by ‘friendly’ AA fire. A larger raid passed the coast without interception but by 09.30 all the enemy aircraft had withdrawn.

10.25 and two large raids were detected. 30 Ju 88s escorted by 40 Bf 109s and 30 Do 17s escorted by 40 Bf 109s. The first crossed the coast near Dover and was intercepted by No 54 Squadron, the other crossed near Hythe and was met by No 501 Squadron. 1 Bf 109 was shot down for the loss of 1 Hurricane. Reports show that very few bombs were dropped, presumably as the bombers struggled to find their targets.

The Luftwaffe kept controllers guessing, with many RDF plots seen over the Channel. Standing patrols were maintained over forward airfields at Hawkinge, Manston and Rochford. At 11.30 a large raid of 30 Do 17s escorted by 60 Bf 109s crossed the coast between Broadstairs and Deal. No 151 Squadron tangled with the Bf 109s on the raids northern flank, while No 610 tangled with those on the southern flank. The Do 17s dropped 150 bombs on Ramsgate and another 60 on the civilian airstrip optimistically called Ramsgate Airport. 1 Bf 109 was shot down for the loss of 1 Hurricane destroyed and another 4 fighters damaged.

At 12.30 Three raids crossed the coast between Deal and Dover, two comprising about 40 Bf 109s turned back but the third, 20 Ju 88s and its escort of 30 Bf 109s headed for Manston and bombed the airfield just as No 264 Squadron’s Defiants took off. Manston was badly damaged, communications were cut, the airfield rendered unusable and most staff evacuated. Both No 501 Squadron, which had just taken off from Gravesend and No 264 Squadron intercepted the raid as it withdrew. The Luftwaffe lost 3 Bf 109s and 4 Ju 88s, with another badly damaged. The RAF lost 4 Defiants, an ominous sign of things to come.

The Luftwaffe continued to use almost continuous flights over the Channel to occupy the RDF stations, the controllers at the Bentley Priory filter room and their subordinate controllers at the Group control rooms. It caused the RAF to maintain standing patrols, often fruitless. Eventually 12 Bf 109s of I./JG 26 ventured over the coast at Dover to be met by the Hurricanes of No 32 Squadron, 2 of the Hurricanes were shot down, the Bf 109s escaped unscathed. Further north, near Canterbury, No 54 Squadron had an inconclusive encounter with 20 Bf 109s, being lucky to escape without losses. The squadron’s intelligence report drily noted that

‘A dog-fight developed in which our aircraft were greatly outnumbered and had difficulty extricating themselves.’

15.15 to 16.00 a big battle was fought, mainly over the Thames estuary. The principal targets were the airfields at Hornchurch and North Weald, both north of the Thames.

The Hornchurch raid: This comprised 30 Ju 88s escorted by 70 Bf 109s and was first sighted by No 501 Squadron off the coast of Folkestone. The raid was pursued across Kent, 501 finally engaging between Maidstone and Gravesend. Hornchurch was bombed again. No 610 Squadron, which had just taken off from Hornchurch also attacked the raid. Only 6 bombs hit the airfield.

The North Weald raid: as the previous raid withdrew this raid of 60 He 111s escorted by 80 Bf 109s and 20 Bf 110s approached the Thames estuary. It was initially intercepted by Nos. 54 and 65 Squadrons and then No 615 followed by Nos 151 and 111. Despite their efforts, North Weald was heavily bombed, an estimated 150-200 bombs hit the airfield. As this force withdrew it was attacked by Nos 16 and 56 Squadrons. No 32 Squadron, which had refuelled and rearmed at Hawkinge engaged a force of Bf 109s which arrived to escort the bombers back across the Channel. At least some of No 54 Squadron who were still airborne joined in. There were losses on both sides. The Luftwaffe lost 5 Bf 109s, 5 He 111s. The RAF had lost 4 of its fighters with several more damaged.

The final large action of the day took place over the Solent and Portsmouth as the Luftwaffe’s attention turned west and onto 10 Group. At 16.10 a large raid was 35 miles south of the Isle of Wight and comprised 46 Ju 88s of I and III/KG 51 with an escort of more than 200 Bf 109s, the entire combined strength of JGs 2, 27 and 53. The 10 Group controller dispatched his squadrons or elements thereof to meet the raid, Nos 17, 43, 234, 609, 249 and 1 (RCAF) all took off. As the raid passed east of the Isle of Wight the fighters separated from the bombers and engaged the British fighters (so much for a close escort). The bombers proceeded to bomb Portsmouth, killing 55 and injuring another 225. The Luftwaffe lost a Bf 109 and a Bf 110 and the RAF a single Spitfire.

Also lost today were 2 Blenheims of No 235 Squadron, Coastal Command, another was damaged. These aircraft were attacked by Hurricanes of No 1 (RCAF) Squadron, making its debut in the battle. The Blenheims were patrolling the aerodrome at Thorney Island. There was obviously a political element to this, calls for a Board of Enquiry etc. It was Dowding who put an end to the incident on 27 August when, having received all relevant reports, he wrote to the Air Ministry

‘In my view these papers make the facts of the accident sufficiently clear and I would suggest that a formal Court of Enquiry is hardly necessary. I would request, therefore, that you will take the matter up as you see fit with the Headquarters, Royal Canadian Air Force in London and inform me if it is thought that any further action is required.

I have no doubt that all concerned view this tragic mistake with the sincerest regret and I have already expressed my personal grief to the Air Officer Commanding, Coastal Command.’

Before judging it is worth considering how similar the two types appear, particularly through several inches of armoured glass, in variable light and at 250 mph.



The Blenheim is the image at the top.

The final figures for the day show that the Luftwaffe had lost 27 aircraft with another 15 damaged of which 10 were written off, so a total of 37 aircraft lost. The RAF had lost 18 aircraft with a further 17 damaged, of which 2 were written off, so a total of 20 aircraft lost. This may seem a narrow margin of victory, it did to the British at the time, but again the Luftwaffe had failed to achieve anything like the targets it had set for itself.

Tonight would see the first serious night time bombing of London. It was not intentional, KG 1, aiming at the Thameshaven oil terminal by night missed and bombs fell across the East End. 76 incidents were reported across the city 9 people were killed, 58 injured. For some this was the start of the Blitz.

[stona]

Sunday 25 August

A fine start but becoming cloudy later.

There was very little Luftwaffe activity in the morning and into the afternoon, That would all change after tea. The first signs of large scale activity were detected at 16.40, over the Cherbourg Peninsular. As the raid developed and set of across the Channel towards Portland it was estimated at 100+. It comprised 37 Ju 88s of KG 51 with an enormous escort of 103 Bf 110s of ZG 2, ZG 76 and V./(Z)LG1 and 214 bf 109s of JG 2, JG 27 and JG 53. It was certainly 100+, in fact 354 Luftwaffe aircraft were approaching the south coast, of which just 37 were the bombers and targets for Fighter Command. This was a manifestation of a new tactic employed by the Luftwaffe intended to both fend off the British fighters from the bombers and destroy as many of those fighters as possible. The 10 Group controller ordered seven squadrons into the air, Nos 17, 152, 609, 602, 213, 87 and 234.

Nos. 213 and 87 were the first to engage, but the enemy formation pressed on to Warmwell. No 609 now joined the attacks, just before the airfield was bombed. Nos 17 and 152 joined in as the raid withdrew but were fended off by the escort. The fighting was fierce and 9 of the RAF fighters were shot down, another 3 landed badly damaged. The Luftwaffe had lost 5 Bf 109s, and 7 Bf 110s but just 1 Ju 88 as the escorts had succeeded in protecting their charges.

This brings us to claiming:

The Luftwaffe claimed 35 destroyed in the air and 25-30 on the ground, whereas the actual figures are 9 and 0.

The RAF pilots made claims for 42 destroyed (with many more ‘probable’ or ‘damaged’) when the actual figure was 13.

The problem faced by the intelligence officers on both sides, trying to assess the damage inflicted on the enemy is obvious. It was a greater problem for the Germans, who had underestimated the strength of Fighter Command, than it was for the British, who had overestimated the strength of the Luftwaffe.

Just before 18.00 enemy activity was detected over Cap Gris Nez. At 18.20 a force estimated at 100+ began to cross the Straits of Dover. This again reflected the Luftwaffe’s new tactic, a force of just 12 Do 17s from I./KG 76 was escorted by a large force of 50 Bf 109s from JG 26 and 36 Bf 109s from I and III./JG 54. At 18.50, as Goering would have liked, the Bf 109s of JG 26 made a freelance sweep (Freijagd) ahead of the raid. This drew the attention of Nos 616 and 54 Squadrons, shortly joined by No 32 Squadron who reached the bombers. The Luftwaffe lost 1 Bf 109 and 1 Do 17, but the RAF lost 4 of its fighters with another two damaged.

The final combat of the day took place between No. 610 Squadron and 12 Bf 109s making a sweep over the Channel. Fighters made these sweeps to confuse British RDF and they were rarely intercepted. This time it seems that the two formations chanced upon each other. 1 Spitfire was shot down, making a forced landing behind Deal. The pilot, F/O F T Gardiner, was burned and eventually became an instructor to Army glider pilots.

The RAF had lost 14 fighters today, with another 5 damaged and 2 written off. The Luftwaffe had also lost 14 aircraft, with 11 damaged and another 3 written off.

British pilots did not suffer the ‘Kanalkrankheit’ of their German opponents, but many were reaching the limit of their reserves. Most felt that they had no choice, summed up by Laurence Thoroughgood who explained

“We were fighting over our home ground and this had a great bearing on our morale. The Luftwaffe certainly had the numbers but this only seemed to spur us on. We certainly got tired but we were fit and young.”

On 25th August No 54 Squadron was down to just 7 serviceable Spitfires but would have to fight on. No 32 Squadron, who had managed to reach the bombers today had lost another pilot, meaning that there were hardly enough pilots to for a full Flight (6 aircraft). Peter Brothers later recalled

“We were down to seven pilots. Funnily enough, of the original pre-war squadron, many had been shot down, wounded, some burned but nobody killed. It was only the new boys who had died.”

On the 27th No 32 Squadron was withdrawn from the battle and went to Northumberland to rest and regain its strength. This of course meant that new and untried squadrons would have to rotate into Nos 10 and 11 Groups, with unfortunate consequences. No 616 Squadron had moved to Kenley on 19th August and would virtually be wiped out in the next few weeks. P/O William Walker would be shot down tomorrow, probably by Werner Molders, and was lucky to be picked up from the Channel by a passing trawler. He remembered later

“We were very unsure of ourselves at this time. Everything happened so quick, and of course our formations, our vics and lines astern were all wrong. There was so little information available to us. Very little was passed on by those squadrons that we relieved as they just couldn’t wait to get the hell out of it! Fighting in the south, where the 109s always seemed to have the advantage of height and sun, was very different indeed to chasing about after unescorted bombers up north.”

The Germans were suffering too. Today Peter Stahl, who had remained on the edge of the action, flying Ju 88s with KG 30 in Luftflotte 5 wrote in his diary.

“It is being said that the British are already on their last legs, but when one hears what the operational pilots, and particularly the bomber crews, have to report, we’re obviously still a long way from victory. The losses suffered on our bomber units must be terrible.”

By the beginning of September even KG 30 would have two Gruppen which had suffered such losses that they were only conditionally operational.

Erhard Milch concluded a five day tour of the Luftwaffe in France. His report contained a litany of problems.

Eprg 210 was short 11 Bf 110s a Bf 109 and 10 crews. JG 26 was short 30 pilots. JG 3 was short 10 Bf 109s.

Bomber units were even worse off. II./KG 2 was short 9 crews and 12 wireless operators, II./KG 2 was short 15 crews and I./KG 2 was short 7 crews and 8 Do 17s (the whole Geschwader was short 17 aircraft). KG 53 was short 32 He 111s and II./KG 53 had also run out of engine spares. Some units had 25% of crews on the sick list, and they didn’t have flu. Serviceability rates were low.

Out of an establishment of 35-40 aircraft per Gruppe, bomber units averaged just 20 serviceable aircraft, Bf 109s only 18 and Bf 110s as low as 15.