Monday 9 September
Scattered showers, thundery in the east. Fair in the Channel.
The weather had taken a turn for the worse. There was little action in the morning, a few reconnaissance flights were chased away. Usually the Luftwaffe made its first attacks on aerodromes in the morning and Park correctly guessed that the Luftwaffe today would concentrate on metropolitan targets rather than his aerodromes. He asked squadrons from Nos 10 and 12 Groups to be ready to cover airfields and aircraft factories and moved some of his 11 Group squadrons forward to their satellite fields in readiness for the expected afternoon attack.
At 16.00 enemy formations were detected by RDF massing over the Calais-Boulogne area. At 17.00 the first raid, a large fighter sweep, crossed the coast between North Foreland and Dover. Park refused to be drawn, but when this were followed by raids which included the bombers of KG 1, KG 2, KG 30 and KG 53, escorted by a large force of fighter aircraft, both Bf 109s and Bf 110s, he had to react. The Luftwaffe force totalled about 350 aircraft. In total nine squadrons were scrambled. No 607, up from Tangmere, intercepted a force of bombers over Surrey and with the help of No 605 Squadron turned them back at the cost of six of their Hurricanes. 605 Squadron also lost two of its aircraft. P/O Jim Humphreys was one of the victims.
“We were bounced by the Me 110s, which I had not seen. Probably they were on free range. My aircraft was hit three or four times, one being a 20mm high explosive right beside the throttle quadrant. I went down in an aileron turn for 2,000 ft to 3,000 ft and took stock. There was a sizeable hole in the cockpit wall, the throttle quadrant was gone, the cockpit was full of smoke and petrol fumes and I was feeling mighty sick. It seemed that she was about to burn so I baled out. This would be about 12,000 ft. I did not want to stay in that area, so I did a free fall down to cloud level (about 3,000ft) and opened my ‘chute. My hand was a mess – blood, flesh, bone and glove all mixed up together – so for the rest of the descent, I was hanging grimly onto the pressure point.”
Two of 12 Groups squadrons, patrolling Coltishall and Fowlmere (No 611) took what seems to have been a unilateral decision to head south where they too joined the fray. Nos 253 and 303 (Polish) Squadrons engaged more bombers south of London (one report says Beachy Head, which seems unlikely given the timings!) No 1 (RCAF) Squadron also became tangled up with a formation of Bf 110s, which adopted its typical defensive circle.
As the confused fighting continued over the south east 12 Group’s ‘Big Wing’, low on fuel and in some disarray also arrived. It comprised Nos 19, 242 and 310(Czech) Squadrons. They certainly added to the confusion. There was at least one collision, between the Hurricanes of F/Lt Gordon Sinclair and F/O John Boulton, who was killed. Sinclair recalled,
“Our formation was too tight, and as I prepared to attack a Dornier my wing collided with Johnnie’s. Whose fault it was we will never know, but sadly Johnnie Boulton was killed. I then collided with the Dornier and had to get out. I took to my parachute, and sprained my ankle when I landed in Coulsdon High Street. Then a detachment of guardsmen arrived from nearby Caterham. And the Lieutenant in charge was an old school chum of mine! He said, “Good God, Gordon, what are you doing lying there?”
The Duxford Wing claimed a ludicrous twenty aircraft destroyed. They had done no such thing but the arrival of another 36 British fighters had an important effect of the German bombers. Many jettisoned their bombs and dived for home. Only one raid made it to London, bombing was otherwise widely distributed and ineffective. For the Luftwaffe aircrew, who had met little resistance on the previous two days and had been told that Fighter Command was a depleted force, today’s events came as a shock. Clearly there was more work to be done
Today Fighter Command also reassessed its tactics. Park realised that with such strong escorts he would have to concentrate his forces before they attacked the enemy raids. A single squadron attacking enabled at least some of the escorting fighters to ignore it and continue with the bombers. The point of attacking the raids almost continuously was to force the escorting fighters to commit themselves, causing the Bf 109s to quickly use up their reserves of fuel and turn for home, exposing the real targets, the bombers, to further attacks. Park issued an instruction to his controllers to try to send pairs of squadrons together, whenever possible operating from the same station and always under the control of the same sector. Once contact was made with the enemy, control reverted to the individual squadron leaders, as before. This would be expanded upon and formalised in a directive issued to controllers tomorrow. Park had always deployed his fighters in a series of screens and had always considered it desirable for squadrons of Spitfires to engage the higher flying escort fighters, due to that types much superior performance, particularly at altitude. It is not a myth that there was a general plan that Spitfires should take on the high flying escorts as a means to enabling the Hurricanes to take on the close escorts and the bombers, but this was always qualified by the overriding requirement to target the bombers. Park wrote in his report on this the London phase of the Battle,
“The general plan adopted was to engage the enemy high-fighter screen with pairs of Spitfire squadrons from Hornchurch and Biggin Hill half-way between London and the coast, and so enable Hurricane squadrons from London Sectors to attack bomber formations and their close escorts…”
In reality, this general plan rarely survived first contact with the enemy, it is certainly not a pattern discernible in the reports which I have read over the last few weeks. Very often it was not the British fighters that initiated the combat, and when they did, they were often attacked in turn by German fighters leaving them fighting for their lives. The niceties of Park’s general plan were not a pressing consideration at times like this. In December, after the Battle of Britain, and Park’s departure, these ideas were formalised in a Tactical Memorandum.
One of the bombers lost today was a Ju 88, 4D+AD, of Stab III./KG 30, which made a forced landing in the shallows of Pagham Harbour following attacks by British fighters. Two of the crew were killed. Below is the body of young Gefr. Friederich Petermann. It was most unusual for a photograph like this to be taken. Usually dead airmen of both sides were afforded the decency of a covering, a blanket, coat, even parachute material.
Petermann would be buried at Bognor Regis cemetery. His was just one of the hundreds of young lives lost in the Battle, lest we forget.
The RAF had lost 21 aircraft to the Luftwaffe’s 28, but much of the fighting had been between the fighters, reflected in the Luftwaffe’s loss of 12 Bf 109s and 4 Bf 110s. Nonetheless, today had been a tactical victory for the RAF.
Tonight, 170 bombers from Luftflotte 3 returned to British airspace and again Fighter Command proved powerless at night. The bombers dropped 230 tons of high-explosive bombs and 290 containers of incendiary bombs. One of the bombs struck the River Thames at Hungerford Bridge, hitting a railway tunnel under the Thames which remains unusable to this day. 370 people were killed and another 1,400 injured as bombs fell across London. Somerset House, the Royal Courts of Justice, Madame Tussaud’s and the Natural History Museum were notable buildings hit.
One of the Bf 109s shot down today was that of Obltn Gunther Bode of Stab I./JG27. He made a good landing at Knowle Farm, Mayfield in Sussex. We have an eyewitness account from Mrs Shelmerdine, the farmer’s wife, which gives a different perspective to the official reports.
“After the aircraft had crash landed the pilot climbed out and pulled off his flying helmet. All the men on the farm rushed up to him with pitchforks, but my husband arrived on the scene and sorted things out. My husband was a tall military looking figure and the German pilot said to him ‘Ah…Officer?’ I could tell that he was also a gentleman by his perfect manner and his bearing. He started to play with my black Labrador, but I called him away. The German airman seemed upset, and said ‘oh, but he lufs me, Ja?’ To which I replied. ‘Yes, but we don’t.’ He was taken to Mark Cross Police Station and upon arrival there he asked if he could use the toilet. This he was allowed to do and he promptly disposed of all his personal papers. The plane itself was in the big ‘twelve acre’ field, the military fenced it off and covered it with camouflage netting but it stopped there for at least three weeks. This worried me because it was near the house and buildings and I was sure it could be seen from the air.”
Here a couple of likely lads pose by the tail of Bode’s Bf 109 in Mrs Shelmerdine’s field. They have clearly ‘adjusted’ the camouflage net to show the national markings to best advantage.
The aircraft was eventually recovered and displayed at Ashford and then Canterbury.
Scattered showers, thundery in the east. Fair in the Channel.
The weather had taken a turn for the worse. There was little action in the morning, a few reconnaissance flights were chased away. Usually the Luftwaffe made its first attacks on aerodromes in the morning and Park correctly guessed that the Luftwaffe today would concentrate on metropolitan targets rather than his aerodromes. He asked squadrons from Nos 10 and 12 Groups to be ready to cover airfields and aircraft factories and moved some of his 11 Group squadrons forward to their satellite fields in readiness for the expected afternoon attack.
At 16.00 enemy formations were detected by RDF massing over the Calais-Boulogne area. At 17.00 the first raid, a large fighter sweep, crossed the coast between North Foreland and Dover. Park refused to be drawn, but when this were followed by raids which included the bombers of KG 1, KG 2, KG 30 and KG 53, escorted by a large force of fighter aircraft, both Bf 109s and Bf 110s, he had to react. The Luftwaffe force totalled about 350 aircraft. In total nine squadrons were scrambled. No 607, up from Tangmere, intercepted a force of bombers over Surrey and with the help of No 605 Squadron turned them back at the cost of six of their Hurricanes. 605 Squadron also lost two of its aircraft. P/O Jim Humphreys was one of the victims.
“We were bounced by the Me 110s, which I had not seen. Probably they were on free range. My aircraft was hit three or four times, one being a 20mm high explosive right beside the throttle quadrant. I went down in an aileron turn for 2,000 ft to 3,000 ft and took stock. There was a sizeable hole in the cockpit wall, the throttle quadrant was gone, the cockpit was full of smoke and petrol fumes and I was feeling mighty sick. It seemed that she was about to burn so I baled out. This would be about 12,000 ft. I did not want to stay in that area, so I did a free fall down to cloud level (about 3,000ft) and opened my ‘chute. My hand was a mess – blood, flesh, bone and glove all mixed up together – so for the rest of the descent, I was hanging grimly onto the pressure point.”
Two of 12 Groups squadrons, patrolling Coltishall and Fowlmere (No 611) took what seems to have been a unilateral decision to head south where they too joined the fray. Nos 253 and 303 (Polish) Squadrons engaged more bombers south of London (one report says Beachy Head, which seems unlikely given the timings!) No 1 (RCAF) Squadron also became tangled up with a formation of Bf 110s, which adopted its typical defensive circle.
As the confused fighting continued over the south east 12 Group’s ‘Big Wing’, low on fuel and in some disarray also arrived. It comprised Nos 19, 242 and 310(Czech) Squadrons. They certainly added to the confusion. There was at least one collision, between the Hurricanes of F/Lt Gordon Sinclair and F/O John Boulton, who was killed. Sinclair recalled,
“Our formation was too tight, and as I prepared to attack a Dornier my wing collided with Johnnie’s. Whose fault it was we will never know, but sadly Johnnie Boulton was killed. I then collided with the Dornier and had to get out. I took to my parachute, and sprained my ankle when I landed in Coulsdon High Street. Then a detachment of guardsmen arrived from nearby Caterham. And the Lieutenant in charge was an old school chum of mine! He said, “Good God, Gordon, what are you doing lying there?”
The Duxford Wing claimed a ludicrous twenty aircraft destroyed. They had done no such thing but the arrival of another 36 British fighters had an important effect of the German bombers. Many jettisoned their bombs and dived for home. Only one raid made it to London, bombing was otherwise widely distributed and ineffective. For the Luftwaffe aircrew, who had met little resistance on the previous two days and had been told that Fighter Command was a depleted force, today’s events came as a shock. Clearly there was more work to be done
Today Fighter Command also reassessed its tactics. Park realised that with such strong escorts he would have to concentrate his forces before they attacked the enemy raids. A single squadron attacking enabled at least some of the escorting fighters to ignore it and continue with the bombers. The point of attacking the raids almost continuously was to force the escorting fighters to commit themselves, causing the Bf 109s to quickly use up their reserves of fuel and turn for home, exposing the real targets, the bombers, to further attacks. Park issued an instruction to his controllers to try to send pairs of squadrons together, whenever possible operating from the same station and always under the control of the same sector. Once contact was made with the enemy, control reverted to the individual squadron leaders, as before. This would be expanded upon and formalised in a directive issued to controllers tomorrow. Park had always deployed his fighters in a series of screens and had always considered it desirable for squadrons of Spitfires to engage the higher flying escort fighters, due to that types much superior performance, particularly at altitude. It is not a myth that there was a general plan that Spitfires should take on the high flying escorts as a means to enabling the Hurricanes to take on the close escorts and the bombers, but this was always qualified by the overriding requirement to target the bombers. Park wrote in his report on this the London phase of the Battle,
“The general plan adopted was to engage the enemy high-fighter screen with pairs of Spitfire squadrons from Hornchurch and Biggin Hill half-way between London and the coast, and so enable Hurricane squadrons from London Sectors to attack bomber formations and their close escorts…”
In reality, this general plan rarely survived first contact with the enemy, it is certainly not a pattern discernible in the reports which I have read over the last few weeks. Very often it was not the British fighters that initiated the combat, and when they did, they were often attacked in turn by German fighters leaving them fighting for their lives. The niceties of Park’s general plan were not a pressing consideration at times like this. In December, after the Battle of Britain, and Park’s departure, these ideas were formalised in a Tactical Memorandum.
One of the bombers lost today was a Ju 88, 4D+AD, of Stab III./KG 30, which made a forced landing in the shallows of Pagham Harbour following attacks by British fighters. Two of the crew were killed. Below is the body of young Gefr. Friederich Petermann. It was most unusual for a photograph like this to be taken. Usually dead airmen of both sides were afforded the decency of a covering, a blanket, coat, even parachute material.
Petermann would be buried at Bognor Regis cemetery. His was just one of the hundreds of young lives lost in the Battle, lest we forget.
The RAF had lost 21 aircraft to the Luftwaffe’s 28, but much of the fighting had been between the fighters, reflected in the Luftwaffe’s loss of 12 Bf 109s and 4 Bf 110s. Nonetheless, today had been a tactical victory for the RAF.
Tonight, 170 bombers from Luftflotte 3 returned to British airspace and again Fighter Command proved powerless at night. The bombers dropped 230 tons of high-explosive bombs and 290 containers of incendiary bombs. One of the bombs struck the River Thames at Hungerford Bridge, hitting a railway tunnel under the Thames which remains unusable to this day. 370 people were killed and another 1,400 injured as bombs fell across London. Somerset House, the Royal Courts of Justice, Madame Tussaud’s and the Natural History Museum were notable buildings hit.
One of the Bf 109s shot down today was that of Obltn Gunther Bode of Stab I./JG27. He made a good landing at Knowle Farm, Mayfield in Sussex. We have an eyewitness account from Mrs Shelmerdine, the farmer’s wife, which gives a different perspective to the official reports.
“After the aircraft had crash landed the pilot climbed out and pulled off his flying helmet. All the men on the farm rushed up to him with pitchforks, but my husband arrived on the scene and sorted things out. My husband was a tall military looking figure and the German pilot said to him ‘Ah…Officer?’ I could tell that he was also a gentleman by his perfect manner and his bearing. He started to play with my black Labrador, but I called him away. The German airman seemed upset, and said ‘oh, but he lufs me, Ja?’ To which I replied. ‘Yes, but we don’t.’ He was taken to Mark Cross Police Station and upon arrival there he asked if he could use the toilet. This he was allowed to do and he promptly disposed of all his personal papers. The plane itself was in the big ‘twelve acre’ field, the military fenced it off and covered it with camouflage netting but it stopped there for at least three weeks. This worried me because it was near the house and buildings and I was sure it could be seen from the air.”
Here a couple of likely lads pose by the tail of Bode’s Bf 109 in Mrs Shelmerdine’s field. They have clearly ‘adjusted’ the camouflage net to show the national markings to best advantage.
The aircraft was eventually recovered and displayed at Ashford and then Canterbury.
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