Battle of Britain diary

[Tim Marlow]

Never really learned the lesson about standardisation did we! Close enough to fit, but not close enough to fit properly.....would it have made any difference at all if the wheels had been the same size.

[stona]

Never really learned the lesson about standardisation did we! Close enough to fit, but not close enough to fit properly.....would it have made any difference at all if the wheels had been the same size.

It would depend on the size of the wheels, and I don't know whether the Whirlwind and Hurricane used the same size. They managed to fit the tyre, so they must have been close. To me the Whirlwind tyres look bigger, but obviously I haven't measured them An undersize tyre might have been made to fit if the rim was a very similar size.

[AlanG]

August 7 1940

In the evening Convoy CW9 consisting of twenty merchant ships and nine destroyers tried to slip through 'Hellfire corner'. It was detected by German Freya radar at Cap Blanc Nez (which the British didn't know they were using). E-boats came in for the attack early in the next morning............

more to follow on the 8th August report

[stona]

Thursday 8 August

Generally cloudy with occasional showers, bright spells gradually spreading from west.

After a very slow few days the action heated up today, particularly in relation to Convoy CW.9 ‘Peewit’.

09.00, the first attack of the day is made on six ships that had left the Solent to join the convoy, unaware that it was behind schedule due to 02.00 attack by KM S-Boats (E-Boats) that had sunk three of ships. 57 Ju 87s, escorted by 30 Bf 109s, attacked the six about 10 miles south of St Catherine’s Point. They sank SS Ajax and SS Coquetdale and damaged the other four. The Luftwaffe arrived as the standing patrol of the convoy was being changed and 12 Hurricanes of No. 145 Squadron arrived, just as the bombing began. They shot down 3 of the Bf 109s and 2 of the Ju 87s, damaging another 2. 145 Squadron lost two Hurricanes.

The next attack on the convoy started at noon, the Germans found the main body of the convoy this time. It can be broken down into three phases.

Phase 1, 11 Hurricanes of No. 257 Squadron were patrolling the convoy when they were bounced by Bf 109s of JG 27 which were flying ahead of the main raid. Three Hurricanes were shot down before Hurricanes of No. 601 Squadron arrived to drive off the attackers.

Phase 2, The bomber force now approached from Cherbourg and was met by Hurricanes of No. 238 Squadron and Spitfires of No. 609 Squadron. A fierce fight took place with the bombers and their escort, 2 Hurricanes were shot down.

Phase 3, at 12.45 Hurricanes of No. 145 Squadron, patrolling the Channel, were ordered to the fight. Realising that they were too late to stop the bombing they flew to the French coast where they attempted to cut off the German withdrawal, ending up in a fight with Bf 110s from V.(Z)/LG1.

The Luftwaffe suffered losses too, 1 Bf 110 was shot down and another 5 were damaged (a sign of things to come?) 1 Ju 87 was also damaged.

The Luftwaffe mounted another attack on ‘Peewit’ in the afternoon. This time a large force of 82 Ju 87s escorted by 20 Bf 110s and 30 Bf 109s approached the convoy. Bad timing and weather hampered the German attack and instead of one heavy blow a series of attacks were made over a half hour or so. The convoy had already started to disperse to the west of the Isle of Wight. The raid was met by Hurricanes of Nos. 43, 238 and 145 Squadrons, and Spitfires from No. 152 Squadron, resulting in a prolonged aerial battle. The RAF shot down 5 Bf 109s and damaged another 2. This time 5 Ju 87s were shot down and another made a forced landing on the Isle of Wight, another 8 were damaged, and several of their crews badly wounded. No 43 Squadron lost 2 Hurricanes with another 4 damaged. 145 Squadron lost 3 Hurricanes, including 1 flown by twenty year old FAA pilot Sub/Lt Francis Alan Smith, who was killed. No 152 Squadron had 2 Spitfires damaged.

For the Luftwaffe ‘Peewit’ had been a target of opportunity, not related to Goering’s ‘Adlerangriffe’ plans. It had been a success, despite the losses. Just 4 of the 21 vessels that had left Southend arrived at Swanage undamaged. The large scale of German operations convinced the British that the expected all-out assault by the Luftwaffe had started. The RAF order of the day, issued that night read

“The Battle of Britain is about to begin. Members of the Royal Air Force, the fate of generations lies in your hands.”

It was a little premature, the next few days did not see the all-out assault, but it was only a matter of time.

[BattleshipBob]

Really enjoying reading this, thanks Stona for taking the time to do this

Bob

[stona]

You are welcome Bob, just better hope I don't get back to work

[stona]

Friday 9 August

Cloud and rain covering the whole UK, heavier in the north.

Despite today’s order of the day, the expected German assault did not materialise.

The only notable event today happened shortly before noon when three Hurricanes of No. 79 Squadron, based at Acklington, engaged an He 111 of 7./KG 26 which jettisoned its bombs over Sunderland before being shot down and landing on the sea. The bomber crew were picked up by a naval patrol boat, all injured or wounded, though they all survived. Four people were killed and seventy eight injured when some houses in Bonnersfield, a hotel, and Laing’s shipyard were hit by the bombs.

A salutary lesson was recorded in No. 249 Squadron’s diary today.

“Friday morning boredom relieved as the sound of shots being discharged during the pay parade in the Squadron hangar, as a result of which no. 566614 Cpl Parry Jones of B Flight grasped his side and fell to the ground. He was found to have been wounded by a bullet and was taken to York Military Hospital by ambulance. On subsequent investigation, it was found that a Hurricane aircraft of no. 73 Squadron was being loaded whilst in the flying position, pointing towards our hangar and two rounds had inadvertently been fired. This incident did a lot towards fostering the already excellent competitive spirit between the two squadrons on the station*.”

*Church Fenton.

[stona]

I remember watching a contemporary RAF instructional scheme showing the method of re-arming a Spitfire, and giving the guns a basic clean, as it would be done between operations. The procedure for a Hurricane would have been essentially the same. Obviously, in the film, great emphasis was placed on proper procedures to make sure that the weapons were safe before anyone stood in front of them with a cleaning rod (or inadvertently aimed them at an occupied hangar). Somebody was obviously not following procedure and I very much doubt that the squadron entry I posted was the end of the matter.

[stillp]

I was once a witness in an enquiry into an incident when an experimental 30mm electronically-controlled Gatling type cannon fired a dummy round when not expected to do so. The target it was pointing at was a sheet of plywood in front of a brick-lined recess in an earth bank. There were two people in that recess at the time...
There's a lot more to this story, but off-topic so ak me when you see me at a show.
Pete

[stona]

Saturday 10 August

Deep depression stationary over Scotland brought squally, thundery showers over much of the UK. There was cloud, rain and thunderstorms over northern France and the Channel.

There was limited operational flying by the Luftwaffe, though the RAF flew 116 patrols with 354 fighters. No casualties on either side.

The British were still waiting for the all out assault to be launched, they knew it was imminent, today the weather excluded any major operations.

At 23.00 F/O Patterson Yellow 1 of 56 Squadron, on a night time patrol between St Athan and Pontypridd, was vectored to a raider by Filton radar. He saw the silhouette of an aircraft which he reported ‘looked like a Spitfire’. Knowing that Yellow 1 was also airborne he asked Filton if any other Spitfires were in the area. Receiving no reply he attacked anyway! The target disappeared into cloud and we will never know what it was. We can only hope that it wasn't a Spitfire, none were lost and none reported being attacked.

[colin m]

Great work again chaps.

[stona]

Sunday 11 August

Clear skies. A high pressure area in the Atlantic indicates fine weather for the next few days.

This is the day that the Battle of Britain really began, and it is not yet ‘Adlertag’. It is impossible to give detailed accounts of the action now, as it would fill pages.

From 10.15 a large raid, 38 Ju 88s with an enormous escort of at least 40 Bf 109s and 60 Bf 110s was intercepted off Portland. This was by far the largest confrontation between the two air forces to date, and fighting raged for almost an hour. At the end of it the Luftwaffe had lost 11 Bf 109s, 6 Ju 88s and 6 Bf 110s. Clearly the British were not sporting enough to go along with the German master plan for the Battle, which was essentially to be lured into combat and shot down by the Luftwaffe’s ‘experten’. There was a price paid by the RAF, 16 Hurricanes were lost

In the South East the day started with Luftwaffe fighter sweeps, that were met with superior British numbers. By 11.15 three Spitfires had been lost for one Bf 109 and an He 59.

Around midday a really big action took place over Convoy Booty in the Thames estuary. Four Bf 110s of Eprg 210 had gone down into the sea, the British lost a Hurricane and two Spitfires.

At about 13.40 another battle began between a large raid comprising 40 Do 17s and 10 Ju 87s escorted by at least 20 Bf 109s from JG 51 and JG 3. No.111 Squadron sent 12 Hurricanes and No. 74 Squadron 6 Spitfires. It was a bad day for 111 Squadron, which lost 4 Hurricanes and all their pilots. The Luftwaffe lost 2 Bf 109s and a Ju 87, various others were damaged.

This was the first day of a battle of attrition. The Luftwaffe had lost or written off 38 aircraft with another 16 damaged, but the RAF had lost 27 fighters and another 18 damaged (with 25 of the pilots killed).

The problem for the Germans, though the British had no way of appreciating this, was that if this continued for the next five weeks, during which the preparations for Sealion were to be made, The Luftwaffe would lose.

Theo Osterkamp seems to have been the only Luftwaffe commander who actually bothered to do some sums. Osterkamp calculated that in order to protect the invasion beaches he would need two complete Geschwader (almost 150 aircraft) over the beach head at all times. By his maths this would require a strength of 12 Geschwader, almost 900 aircraft, more than the Luftwaffe started the Battle with. This implied that they could not sustain any net losses at all. This meant that a gross attrition rate of about 10% per month, say 75 aircraft, was the maximum acceptable. He further calculated that within these constraints and in order to reduce Fighter Command's strength by 50% the Luftwaffe fighters would have to achieve an exchange rate of 5:1. This was in fact the target he set JG 51 when it took up its position on the Channel coast in early July. He ordered his pilots only to attack when a tactical advantage assured them of success with minimal risk. At least Osterkamp had bothered to do the sums. The problem was that the Luftwaffe could never shoot down something like 100 British fighters a week without taking risks. If the British lost 100 fighters in five weeks, to the Germans 20, achieving a 5:1 exchange rate, they would still be able to fight over the beaches and the Luftwaffe would have failed. Essentially, the German plan was dependent on the British committing large numbers of fighters to large air battles, allowing themselves to be bounced and shot down by the Luftwaffe's aces in their Bf 109s. Further raids would then be made on British airfields to mop up anything that was left. Unsurprisingly, the British did not oblige and events today, before the official ‘Adlertag’ clearly showed the scale of the problem the Germans faced.

[Tim Marlow]

Really interesting. I seem to remember reading that the Germans were not really training replacement pilots at this time, especially bomber pilots, so losses impacted on them disproportionately. Was this the case or am I dreaming as usual?

[stona]

Really interesting. I seem to remember reading that the Germans were not really training replacement pilots at this time, especially bomber pilots, so losses impacted on them disproportionately. Was this the case or am I dreaming as usual?

The German training schools were still operating at capacity throughout this period, they would not be severely impacted by fuel and other shortages until after Barbarossa, particularly in 1942. The problem was that the capacity was far too low. There was nothing in any German planning before the war that prepared them for a long haul or the level of losses suffered in 1939/40. At this time the standard training for a fighter pilot, through the various schools, took at least 18 months.

We tend to see the Battle of Britain in isolation, as a campaign that ran through the summer and autumn of 1940, but it was no such thing for the Luftwaffe. It was a continuation of the campaigns in Poland and then western Europe, with only the brief pause of the 'phoney war' (Sitzkrieg). The Luftwaffe had lost more than 1,400 aircraft to all causes in May-June 1940, 28% of its total strength, and a corresponding number of highly trained aircrew. It had not made up its significant personnel losses when it started what we call the Battle of Britain.

The Battle of Britain compounded these already significant losses.

The Luftwaffe bombers started with just 75% of operational ready crews against establishment in July 1940 and this fell to just 59% by September. Bomber crews required considerably longer training to operate multi engine types and also were typically qualified in night and instrument flying, unlike their fighter colleagues, most of whom were not qualified for either. They were consequently in very short supply.

The Bf 110 force started with 84% operational ready crews, but their losses saw this fall to 64%, a reflection of the mis-use of the type as a bomber escort and its vulnerability to single seat fighters. It is a myth that the Bf 110s were themselves escorted by Bf 109s, with the exception of those operating as fighter-bombers, in which role they were sometimes effective. They would be very effective in this role on the eastern front in the coming years.

For the Bf 109s the numbers are 81% and 77% a reflection of both the quality of the aircraft and its pilots and that it was not the target for British fighters. Park emphasised on several occasions, beginning with his conference with his squadron commanders at Northolt on 14th June to discuss air fighting tactics, that the aim was the destruction of enemy bombers and that any action against fighters was only a means to this end.

[AlanG]

Sunday 11 August

From 10.15 a large raid, 38 Ju 88s with an enormous escort of at least 40 Bf 109s and 60 Bf 110s was intercepted off Portland. This was by far the largest confrontation between the two air forces to date, and fighting raged for almost an hour. At the end of it the Luftwaffe had lost 11 Bf 109s, 6 Ju 88s and 6 Bf 110s. Clearly the British were not sporting enough to go along with the German master plan for the Battle, which was essentially to be lured into combat and shot down by the Luftwaffe’s ‘experten’. There was a price paid by the RAF, 16 Hurricanes were lost

My records show fifty-four Ju88 from I. & II./KG54, twenty He111 from KG27, sixty-one Bf110 from ZG2 and thirty Bf109 from JG2. Bf109 from JG27 would turn up later.

Forty-two allied fighters from five squadrons were scrambled to meet the raid, with 11 Group sending a further thirty-two Hurricanes from three squadrons to assist them.

In the South East the day started with Luftwaffe fighter sweeps, that were met with superior British numbers. By 11.15 three Spitfires had been lost for one Bf 109 and an He 59.

These were Bf109 and Bf110 from Erpobungsgruppe 210

Around midday a really big action took place over Convoy Booty in the Thames estuary. Four Bf 110s of Eprg 210 had gone down into the sea, the British lost a Hurricane and two Spitfires.

Bf110 from Erpobungsgruppe 210 and ZG26 with Ju88 from KG2 attacked 'Booty'.

17, 74 and 85 Squadrons in turn attacked the raiders.

At about 13.40 another battle began between a large raid comprising 40 Do 17s and 10 Ju 87s escorted by at least 20 Bf 109s from JG 51 and JG 3. No.111 Squadron sent 12 Hurricanes and No. 74 Squadron 6 Spitfires. It was a bad day for 111 Squadron, which lost 4 Hurricanes and all their pilots. The Luftwaffe lost 2 Bf 109s and a Ju 87, various others were damaged.

The raid was against a convoy in the Thames estuary. 111 Sqn also lost one more Hurricane , crash landing (written off) when he ran out of fuel.