Battle of Britain diary

[stona]

Paul. Maidstone really was in the thick of it. Anyone flying from the Calais region to London is pretty much going right over the top of you, plus many of Fighter Command's vital aerodromes were in Kent between the coast and the London suburbs. Many interceptions were made in the area. I remember the BoB museum excavating a Hurricane that came down on a terrace of houses in the town during the Battle, killing both the pilot and several members of the same family on the ground, including 5 or 6 children (?). It was many years ago and I don't remember the details, I might look them up for a later post if applicable

@Tim, thanks very much. Trying to condense everything into a sensible post is quite fun, and probably helps make it seem a bit more pacey. I enjoy the first hand accounts and individual detail and I hope others do to.
Obviously, I leave out a lot of the mind numbing detail I'll leave that to the proper historians.
I've been trying to condense tomorrow's events and will have another go this morning, now the grand kids have been handed back! Tomorrow was a big day, as those reading this will be well aware. It was decisive in the minds of some at the time (and since).

[stona]

Saturday 7 September

Fair again, with some haze clearing later.

Today was, in my humble opinion, the decisive day of the Battle. London ‘Loge’ was to be the target of the Luftwaffe’s efforts. It is impossible to understand why this was such an important change in strategy without an appreciation of the effect of the previous two weeks’ impact on Fighter Command. Yesterday Park had written his report on the state of 11 Group. Today Dowding convened a meeting at Bentley Priory to address the crisis in his Command, and discuss ways of not only ‘going downhill’ as slowly as possible, but ways of ensuring returning to the top of the hill would be as easy as possible.

I will split today’s post into four parts. The first two are not regular diary entries, which I will post in the third and fourth sections, covering the action and its aftermath, so you can skip to ‘Parts 3 and 4’ if you are desperate to get to the action

Before leaving for Bentley Priory Park issued an instruction to his controllers. On one occasion the previous day just seven of the eighteen squadrons dispatched had made successful interceptions. It had come to his notice that some controllers were ordering their squadrons to altitudes a couple of thousand feet above that ordered by their Group controllers. In fear of being ‘bounced’ the squadron leaders were also adding a few thousand feet. As a result, the intercepting fighters were running directly into the escorting fighters, provoking exactly the fighter v fighter combat that Park was keen to avoid. The real targets, the bombers, were getting through, unmolested, below. On the 6th most bombers had only been intercepted after they bombed, and this was unacceptable. The practice had to stop forthwith.

Park (and Dowding’s) realism should not be taken for defeatism, as it has been by some writers recently. As they made their dispositions this morning Park had a conversation with his chief controller, Willoughby de Broke.

“I know you and the other controllers must be getting worried about our losses” Park said. Willoughby de Broke replied that he was indeed concerned. “Well,” Park said, “I’ve been looking at these casualty figures, and I’ve come to the conclusion that at our present rate of losses we can just afford it. And I’m damned certain that the Boche can’t. If we can hang on as we’re going, I’m sure we shall win in the end.”

PART ONE – THE CONFERENCE.

There were seven men present in the room. Dowding, Park, Evill and Nicholl of Fighter Command, Sholto-Douglas the effective Chief of the Air Staff as the actual CAS, Newall, faded into the background, a Group Captain from the Air Ministry and an NCO to take the minutes.

Dowding opened the meeting by assuming that the current measures to keep fully trained and fully equipped squadrons in the Battle would fail. The current policy had been to concentrate a large number of squadrons in the south-east with squadrons on the fringe brought in at Park’s request only on the worst days. Tired or defeated squadrons could be rotated out of the line and fresh ones brought in as required. We have seen this happening over that last few days of this critical period. However, it was apparent that if the present scale of attacks continued this replacement policy would become impossible. Dowding wanted to plan for such an eventuality. Both he and Park were opposed to the amalgamation of squadrons, though they might have to rob squadrons in the three supporting Groups of their operational pilots to make up shortages. It seemed that just about enough pilots would be available, the problem was how to turn them into combat pilots. Dowding also emphasised that the Germans must not be allowed to know how hard hit his command was, and that 11 Group had to be kept up to its current strength.

Douglas now intervened to ask whether they were being too pessimistic, talking about going downhill.

Dowding disagreed, stating that Park was already calling for reinforcements to five squadrons which had themselves only just come into the line.

Douglas said that there was no shortage of pilots, provoking Dowding to begin to explain the skills needed to be a combat ready, operational pilot. Douglas simply interrupted to say that Fighter Command would be kept up to strength. Douglas’s inability to understand the difference between a pilot fresh from the reduced OTU course and a fully operational pilot seems to have baffled Dowding. More than one historian writing on the battle has also failed to grasp this vital distinction.

Evill now intervened. Total casualties for the four weeks ending 4 September were 348. The three OTUs had produced just 280 pilots in the same period, a shortfall of 68, quite apart from accidents and illness.

Park added that casualty figures in 11 Group were running at nearly 100 a week. There was a pilot shortage. That day nine of his squadrons had started with fewer than 15 pilots and the previous day had seen squadrons assembled as composite units.

Dowding interrupted with his now famous comment. ‘You must realise’ he said, ‘that we are going downhill’.

Park continued. It was better to have twenty one squadrons with no fewer than twenty one pilots than to have a greater number of under strength squadrons in his Group. Some of his squadrons were doing fifty hours flying a day and while they were flying their airfields were being bombed. While on the ground they could not get proper meals or rest.

Douglas, who had still failed to grasp what was being said, suggested another OTU. Evill pointed out that this would have to be done very quickly to make a difference. Dowding pointed out that such a unit would itself be a drain on his resources.

Park now described his scheme for sector training flights. Pilots from the OTUs were not fit to fight, until they received extra training, traditionally done at their squadrons. Training flights had now been cancelled because all experienced pilots were needed for the fighting and all stations were dispersed because of the bombing. He proposed that pilots from OTUs should go to squadrons in the north for further training and that squadrons in the south should receive only fully trained men from the north to fill their gaps. This was the basis of the so called ‘stabilisation system’.

Dowding argued that he must always have some fresh operational squadrons to exchange for 11 Group’s most badly hit squadrons.

Park agreed that the two schemes could run in parallel.

The next day Nicholl informed all the Group commanders that squadrons were to be divided into three classes. Class A squadrons, all those in 11 Group, were to be maintained at a minimum strength of 16 operational pilots. Some in Nos 10 and 12 Groups were similarly designated, though not all 16 pilots had to be operational. Class B squadrons could include up to 6 non-operational pilots to be trained on the job. Class C squadrons might retain a minimum of 3 operational pilots, just one section, rendering these entire squadrons effectively non-operational training units, something to be borne in mind when looking at raw pilot/squadron numbers. Evill hoped that Class C squadrons might produce as many as five operational pilots every week.

This scheme remained in place until November. It was a desperate measure and a reflection of how serious the shortage of operational pilots was at this time.

[stona]

Saturday 7 September

PART 2 – THE GERMAN PLAN

Goering and his staff had spent the last 24 hours drawing up a plan for the first day of this new phase of the Battle.

1. On the evening of 7 September, Luftflotte 2 will carry out a major operation against target ‘A’ Loge [London]

2. The attack will take place in the following stages:

18:00: initial attack to be carried out by Fliegerkorps II using one Kampfgeschwader;

18:40: main attack to be carried out by Fliegerkorps II, using the remaining Kampfgeschwaders;

19:00: Fliegerkorps I shall attack, using KG 30

21:00: 9. Fliegerdivision shall attack, using all available aircraft.

3.Fighters and escort:

a) The initial attack will draw most of the British fighters into the air, so that they will have left the area when the main attack takes place.

b) Jafü 2 is responsible for the escort, using one Jagdgeschwader per Kampfgeschwader.

c) From 18:40 ZG 76 will clear the air of British fighters in the target areas assigned to Fliegerkorps I and shall protect the bomber formations’ approach and return flights.

d) Jafü 2 shall assign two Jagdgeschwader to meet the units from I. and II. Fliegerkorps when they return from their attacks.

4. Implementation:

a) Bomber units will meet the fighters during flight over the coast. The fighters shall avoid weaving unnecessarily.

b) The approach route is to be determined in consultation between the air corps and Jafü 2.

c) Regarding the escort of units subordinate to Jafü 2: As the fighter aircraft are flying to the limit of their range, every detour is to be avoided and the approach must be done at the highest possible airspeed.

d) Flight altitude after meeting with fighter aircraft: between 5,000 and 6,500 metres. By using vertical separation, the length of formations is to be kept down as much as possible. The return flight shall be carried out in a shallow dive, so that the English coast is passed at about 4,000 metres altitude.

The details were left, as was the German way, to the individual commanders and their subordinates.

Of note is the altitude at which the formations would arrive, slightly higher than was normal for the bombers.

[stona]

Saturday 7 September

PART 3 – THE ACTION.

I cannot possibly cover all the action today in a post of sensible length. Hopefully, I can give a broad overview and an impression of the scale of operations.

Goering’s orders had reached the relevant commands by early afternoon. Having spent the morning touring various Luftwaffe units, he took himself to Cap Gris Nez from where he would watch the evening action.

In England, the day dawned clear and Fighter Command braced itself for further attacks. Nothing happened. A lone reconnaissance aircraft which flew over Liverpool was chased and shot down. No.66 Squadron on a routine patrol was vectored to intercept a small raid, but when it found only fighters it broke away.

Just before 16.00 RDF detected the first signs of a build up over France. The first counters were placed on the situation map at Fighter Command’s HQ at Bentley Priory. Park was still present at this time, 11 Group’s response would be handled by his chief controller, Willoughby de Broke, who brought many of his squadrons to readiness. By far the largest raid of the war to date, and the largest aerial armada ever assembled was taking shape over France. The Luftwaffe had committed 348 bombers and 617 fighters to the assault on Britain’s capital. According to Goering’s instruction this vast formation started across the Channel on a front twenty miles wide. The first Observer Corps reports of ‘many hundreds’ of aircraft reached Maidstone at 16.16. One minute later eleven of 11 Groups squadrons were scrambled, and any remaining were brought to readiness. Nos. 10 and 12 Groups were given notice that they might be required to help.

Once across the coast the Luftwaffe formation split up and the Observer Corps struggled to track the huge number of aircraft. One large group was heading north, towards the Essex coast, threatening North Weald and other 12 Group airfields, which the British assumed to be its target. Another group, estimated at 200 bombers plus escort, seemed to be heading for Biggin Hill and Kenley. A third Group seemed to be heading from the coast in the general direction of London. Fighter Command had quite reasonably reacted to a threat to its airfields, given events of the past week or so. It was only when the first group of bombers suddenly swung west and headed directly up the Thames, and the second group by passed the sector stations, passed over central London and then swung towards the east End that the real target was revealed. All Fighter Command’s airborne squadrons were ordered to leave their patrols and head for the capital. They had been caught on the hop, in the wrong place, for once. There is a terrible irony in this. Fighter Command and its predecessor, Air Defence of Great Britain had to a large extent been designed to protect London. Inter-war exercises concentrated on this. The doomsday literature of the inter-war years foresaw major cities deluged with explosives and poison gas. After a year of war none of it had happened, and when it did the instrument supposed to prevent it was caught out. When the first bombs fell, there were 23 British squadrons airborne, all frantically trying to get to the capital.

The first four squadrons to have scrambled, Nos 1 and 303 (Polish) from Northolt, No 504 from Hendon and No 501 from Gravesend were closest, patrolling their airfields and the Thameshaven depot. They were the first to intercept. No. 249 entered the fray over Maidstone but was quickly surrounded by up to sixty Bf 109s. Six Hurricanes were shot down. No 303 ran into some bombers over Essex, S/Ldr Ronald Kellet gave this account.

“We gave them all we’d got opening fire at 450 yards and only breaking away when we could see the enemy completely filling the gunsight. That means we finished the attack at point blank range. We went in practically in one straight line, all of us blazing away.”

Nos. 1 and 63 Squadrons also made interceptions but struggled to breach the fighter screens. No.43 Squadron attacked the formation. A British report noted.

“43 Squadron encountered three enemy formations roughly 20 miles apart. Each formation consisted of 20-25 Do 17 at 15,000 feet with 12-15 Me 110s circling over them at 17,000 feet and 25 Me 109s, Me 110s and possibly He 113s stepped up to 22,000 feet. In the ensuing dogfight it was noticed that when attacked the bombers kept straight on their course whilst the Me 110s dived down to keep off the attacking fighters.”

The true scale of the formation could not be seen by individual units. Francis Mason wrote of the British fighters arriving over London that

“They found themselves on the edge of a tidal wave of aircraft, towering above them, rank upon rank, more than a mile and a half high, covering the sky like some vast irresistible migration.”

S/Ldr ‘Sandy’ Johnstone of No 602 Squadron.

“All we could see was row upon row of German raiders, all heading for London. I have never seen so many aircraft in the air all at the same time. The escorting fighters saw us at once and came down like a ton of bricks, when the squadron split up and the sky became a seething cauldron of aeroplanes, swooping and swerving in and out of the vapour trails and tracer smoke. A Hurricane on fire spun out of control ahead of me while, above to my right, a 110 flashed across my vision and disappeared into the fog of battle before I could draw a bead on it. Everyone was shouting and the earphones became filled with a meaningless cacophony of jumbled noises. Everything became a maelstrom of jumbled impression – a Dornier spinning with part of its port mainplane missing; black streaks of tracer ahead, when I instinctively put my arm up to shield my face; taking a breather when the haze absorbed me for a minute…”

16.43: In London the air raid alarms sounded. At first people were reluctant to head for the shelters, particularly at Upton Park, where West Ham were leading Spurs 4-1, but soon the sound of aircraft and then the sight of the large formations served as an incentive to get people moving.

17:15: The first wave dropped its bombs on Woolwich Arsenal and two large factories. The bombers then turned to the right, away from the fires that started down below where their bombs had exploded. The following waves continued further west and dropped their bombs on both sides of the Thames just where it forms two large loops, where the docks were concentrated. Here the Germans for the first time used 1.5-ton sea mines against the city, as a kind of blockbuster. The greater part of the 300 tons of high-explosive bombs and thousands of incendiary bombs that fell on London that afternoon, was directed against four specific targets: the Victoria and Albert docks, the West India docks and the Surrey Commercial docks. Over three hundred German bombers had dropped their bombs and turned away so as to not get in the way for the next wave. The slum areas of London’s East End were badly hit. 400 Londoners were killed and many thousand were wounded.

As the German formations withdrew, they were harassed by many of Fighter Command's squadrons, including those sent from other Groups, arriving too late to interfere with the bombing. Units like No 234 and 609 Squadrons, both from Middle Wallop in 10 Group made interceptions south of London. The air combats spread out over an area of 25,000 square kilometres.

Some of the Luftwaffe’s Bf 109s had been forced to withdraw, short of fuel, but some of Fighter Command’s aircraft also needed to land and re-fuel. A call had been sent to 12 Group which dispatched its ‘Big Wing’ of Nos 19 (Spitfire) and 242 and 310 Squadrons. It took far too long to assemble, and over the Isle of Sheppey, with No 19 Squadron about 3,000 feet above the two Hurricane squadrons, No 242 was bounced by Bf 109s losing two aircraft. This was not the resounding success that Bader would pretend, and he complained that he was scrambled too late. Everyone thought that they were scrambled too late, but the facts were that it took too long to assemble the Wing and it never had time to achieve sufficient altitude en route to an interception. This would become an issue beyond the scope of this diary, suffice to say that after today’s events, attitudes hardened.

18.15: The ‘All Clear’ sounded in London. There were nine miles of waterfront ablaze. Fire crews were called in from as far afield as Coventry. The destruction was on a level not previously seen in Britain.

[stona]

Saturday 7 September

PART 4 - THE AFTERMATH

British propaganda at the time and to a certain extent post war British accounts played down the German success. All the German bombers had managed to drop their bombs on their targets without being significantly disturbed by either fighter or anti-aircraft fire. The air fighting had also been a new hard blow to Fighter Command. No German formations had been driven back and the British had suffered severe losses. Of the 268 Spitfires and Hurricanes in contact with the enemy, 44 had been shot down and of these, 25 were total losses. Of the German aircraft that took part in the attack, 26 were lost, which is less than three per cent. The German bomber units had done best, their average losses amounted to a mere two per cent, or a total of 7 aircraft. Helmut Staal of II./KG 76 flew in the leading formation of bombers today.

“It had been an easy flight up from the Thames Estuary and along the Thames. There was no opposition and we felt that we had the whole sky to ourselves. We were at 5000 feet*. The docks at Woolwich stood out almost as if beckoning for us to release our bomb load. Through the glass canopy I could see the tall cranes and the long square shape of the three main docks. I lined them up carefully, and as I pressed the release button I looked elsewhere at the huge mass of buildings and warehouses below, then just caught a glimpse of the sticks of bombs as they kinked from side to side as they fell towards earth.”

*This must be a mistranslation or typo in my source. I believe it should read 5,000 metres, but I’ve left it as I found it.



From a German perspective, the day could scarcely have gone better and tonight Luftflotte 3 would return, more than 200 bombers dropped a continuous steam of high explosives and incendiary bombs into the blazing docklands from 20.00 until almost 05.00 on the morning of the 8th. American journalist Ben Robertson watched on, appalled, from high ground south of the city and reported,

“The most appalling and depressing sight any of us had ever seen. It made us almost physically ill to see the enormity of the flames that lit the entire western sky. The London that we knew was burning, the London which had taken thirty generations of men a thousand years to build, and the Nazis had done that in thirty seconds.”

So why did Keith Park reckon this to be the decisive day in the Battle of Britain? Park never considered that to be the 15th, which we now remember as Battle of Britain Day. Park knew how stretched his Group was and the parlous state of Fighter Command in early September. He knew that a switch from attacking his airfields and other infrastructure would allow him time to re-group and re-build. It was a terrible thing to see London burning, Park flew over the inferno in his personal Hurricane to see first-hand the devastation. He had returned to Uxbridge from Bentley Priory just as the last of the bombers made their attacks and had then driven to Northolt where his Hurricane was parked. He would later say,

“It was burning all down the river. It was a horrid sight, but I looked down and said, “Thank God for that”, because I realised that the methodical Germans had at last switched their attack from my vital aerodromes on to cities.”

In Park’s view, which never changed, it was today that the Germans had thrown away any chance of victory. They had unquestionably achieved a success today, but it was a Pyrrhic victory.

Not everyone was so sure at the time. At about the same time as the Luftwaffe’s bombers turned and dived for home the Joint Chiefs of Staff met to assess the situation facing the UK. Having weighed the evidence they concluded that an invasion was imminent. All forces in the UK were ordered to ‘stand by at immediate notice’. General Headquarters, Home Forces, on their own initiative issued at 20.07 the codeword ‘Cromwell’, to bring all their forces to ‘immediate action’. Many thought that this meant that the invasion was already underway. It was not, but the situation seemed grim.

[adt70hk]

Steve

Yet again brilliantly put together. thank you so much for doing this it really has been fascinating to read.

All the best.

Andrew

[Tim Marlow]

Superb read.

[minitnkr]

I'm really enjoying this. Great writing! PaulE

[colin m]

Brilliant work Steve. This is real 'on the edge of my seat' reading.

[stona]

Thanks to one and all.

I'm enjoying doing it and I have the luxury of time due to the current situation. It's been quite an eye opener for me too! You think you are reasonably knowledgeable about something until you start really looking into it in a day by day way like this.

For example, I had no idea how dodgy the weather was during the current period, it was definitely on our side.

I've particularly enjoyed reading the first hand accounts, only a few of which I can include for obvious reasons. Many, maybe half, of the British ones come from Dilip Sarkar's 'The Few'. I would not recommend it as a history of the Battle, there are better for your money, but it is highly recommended if you enjoy first hand accounts, with which it is replete.

Since there is absolutely no chance of mass gatherings any time soon I should have the time to continue for a while yet

[Guest]

I have first hand knowledge, as I am getting to be one of the few, of the Battle of Britain.

At the time I was was two & a bit. Hitler tried but missed. Of course at that age although in it I can only remember little bits.

As I became older in that war I can remember very fully what happened. 50% of the windows in my sister & my bedroom were filled with lino. Glass sucked out by bomb blasts. We were near Marconi, KLG Davis submarine equip. & a little bit futher away Vickers. The sight of these windows became as normal.

Our home at night. Quite cosy. 6 foot square. A hole in the ground in the garden surrounded with concrete with a curved roof on top of corrugated iron topped with earth. An Anderson shelter. But my mum & dad acted as normal but must of been scared stiff for me & my sister..

Just remembered my first memory. We slept under a table in the sitting room during a raid. A Morrison shelter table reinforced. The Anderson shelter came later.

A memory never to be forgotten. The siren. Before a raid it went off, they were all over the place. Must have sounded monotonously for 2 minutes. The raid went on.
The raid finished the siren wailed again. This time more friendly . It started stopped started & went on in that fashion for 2 minutes.

Food was short. We had 12 chickens at the bottom of the garden. Carrots turnips & swedes growing around the shelter. The front garden dug up & filled with potatoes. The chicken feed meal was swapped for the eggs in the ration book. How di i know that at my age then but I did.

When I started school. Sorry bit off B of B. siren went we all made our way, in English lines no rush no panic, to these big shelters dug into the play ground. We then sang & sang until the siren sounded the "all clear". We boys then rushed out into the playground. Arms wide running around like lunatics. What were we we were Hurricanes & Spitfires. Not a 109 among them.

I have to admit I had a good war. My first 7 years of life. So do not moan just enjoy what you have.

Laurie

[Tim Marlow]

You had a better war than my mother then Laurie. She was seven during the battle. She has told me several stories, including being strafed by German planes and has described being caught in a raid on Hasting, trying to get home to Ore village. When they got there they found their home had been blitzed and they had lost all their possessions. They were evacuated several times because Hastings was an invasion target, going to Somerset, Cambridge, and finally Wiltshire. As a consequence they lost contact with several branches of their family, which was irrevocably splintered. She was scared of beaches for many years, imagining they were always covered in barbed wire and mines. Not such a good war really.

[Guest]

Just add. My wife's aunty & uncle, a few doors from the family of my wife (my god my life may have taken a turn,) they retired to theri Anderson Shelter.

They lived in Morden Surrey.

Came out on the siren all clear. Their house. All the bricks were there but all nicely stacked in a pile. The house demolished completely.

Became normal to see gaps between houses. Interesting as the gaps had all been cleared of the demolished material.

Just after the war we would travel up to London to get a train form King's Cross up to Hull & my gran & grandad. The holes between buildings were normal to see.
They were every where. It was a very desolate scene.

I started my career in architecture in 1956. I can say there were even then a lot of large parcels of land in London which we slowly were filling with new buildings.



Laurie

[Guest]

I think the most incredible story of WW11 is that of Hugh Dowding. Commander of Fighter Command at the time of the B of B.

He took the birth child of Sir Henry Tizzard, Radar, & developed the net work over the British Isles to provide knowledge of any predators in the air.

With his organization of Radar & the centers controlling Fighter Command he was able to control the battle in an incredible way.

Dowding realized & knew that Fighter Command lacked the ability to attack the Luftwaffe. The RAF lacked the fighters & experienced pilots to conduct an aggressive campaign. So it had to be a defensive campaign. He had to conserve the pilots & aircraft.

He realized that with radar & with the organization of control centers that he was able to conduct a campaign where the German raiders were met at their most vulnerable.
When they could be attacked by the RAF fighters at points identified by radar. They did not have to roam the skies to find thir foe. The RAF pilots met their foe at specific points with full fuel tanks.

Dowding & Parks his deputy carefully preserved the British Fighters to attack at the the most opportunist time. Preserving RAF aircraft & pilots.

His Spitfires one third Hurricanes two thirds of his force.

He realised that the German 109 had only about 10 minutes over Britain . The Spitfires would eat that time enabling the Hurricanes to set upon the the 110 & German bombers as the 109 returned to their bases.

That was the theory. However it certainly in the main worked. Dowding preserved his "chicks" for the right time at the right moment.

And he won.

Also add that he refused Churchill's demand to send more squardrons to France before the B Of B. Who would do that. Stuffy Dowding a hero in my book.

Laurie

[Guest]

You had a better war than my mother then Laurie. She was seven during the battle. She has told me several stories, including being strafed by German planes and has described being caught in a raid on Hasting, trying to get home to Ore village. When they got there they found their home had been blitzed and they had lost all their possessions. They were evacuated several times because Hastings was an invasion target, going to Somerset, Cambridge, and finally Wiltshire. As a consequence they lost contact with several branches of their family, which was irrevocably splintered. She was scared of beaches for many years, imagining they were always covered in barbed wire and mines. Not such a good war really.

Interesting facts Tim.

I moved to Jersey Channel Isles, just for on year, 59 years ago.

Jersey was bombed strafed by the Germans prior to B of B.

Then Jersey, with all of the Channel Isles, was occupied by the Nazis, the only parts of the British Isles as such.

A great portion of the Islands people, all of Alderney, were taken to England before the Germans took control. The males joined the British forces to fight for their Islands.

There are two bookswritten about all of that. One by a Guernsey Wellington Pilot the other a Jersey Officer in the army.

Just to totally digress. Another book by a Jersey Doctor. An obstetrician. He sent his family to England but remained to look after Jersey expectant mothers..
He played the Germans at their own game .

Normandy landings bypassed the Channel Isles they were left occupied by the Germans. Food ran short bizarrely more for the Germans. The Doctor had a cow. He hoisted it to the first floor of his house. This was knowing the Germans would visit to take any food they could lay their hands on.

Apologies for digressing from the subject. (not really )
















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