Battle of Britain diary

[stona]

Bader is like Marmite.

He flew eight actions during September 1940, yet expressed forthright views as to how the BoB should be won.

He did not understand how Dowding's system worked, it was this as much as the Big Wing controversy that caused so much confusion to 11 Group. He believed, for example, that the Battle should have been controlled from Bentley Priory...which is ridiculous to anyone with any grasp of how the system worked.

He demanded loyalty whilst himself being breathtakingly disloyal to his commander in chief (Dowding).

Some men would follow him to hell and back, others were not so sure. Tom Neil described him as "being somewhat over devoted to his own interests", by no means an exclusive opinion.

James Sanders recalled much later,
"Take Bader. Pilots in 11 Group actually had very little time for Bader and his Wing. There was no way the Big Wing could be operated. He was a gentleman though and he was a marvellous inspiration to the disabled. I remember after the war, I went to a do with my wife Josephine at the Green Room and Bader was Guest of Honour. He gave up his seat to her, you know, with his spindles and all that. 'Good for you', I thought, 'at least you are a gent'.
Talk about damned with faint praise.

He was a gentleman, a driven and difficult man and an unquestionably brave one too. Whatever else they may have thought of him, nobody has ever denied him that.

Oddly, Gibson shared some of the same characteristics. They were both men that you would definitely want fighting on your side, whatever their other shortcomings.

[AlanG]

Sometimes shortcomings get people killed

[Guest]

He demanded loyalty whilst himself being breathtakingly disloyal to his commander in chief (Dowding).

.

Leigh Mallory should have stamped on him as his boss. He seemed to me to be as disloyal to Dowding.

Plus not realising the tactics that Dowding & Parks were following. As a commander he always seemed to be weak.

[Guest]

Is my memory correct did not Bader be taken by Mallory to see Churchill to demand big wings ?

[Tim Marlow]

Let’s be honest, to be an effective leader you don’t have to be liked, but you do need the self confidence to think you are always right.

[Tim Marlow]

It’s not just shortcomings that kill though Alan. R. E. Lee was a consummate field commander who was inordinately successful, winning many battles from an inferior position. He was virtually deified by the men that served under him as a result, but he got plenty of them killed....

[stona]

Is my memory correct did not Bader be taken by Mallory to see Churchill to demand big wings ?

Not quite. It was F/Lt Peter Macdonald, who was Bader's adjutant and also a Member of Parliament who met with Churchill. He went to see Harold Balfour, the Under-Secretary for Air, and asked him to arrange the meeting. According to Balfour he initially refused, but Macdonald reminded him that as an MP he had a right to see the Prime Minister. He did have this right, as an MP, not as a serving officer in the RAF.

The meeting took place on 24 October.

It is beyond the scope of this thread, but the impropriety of a F/Lt by-passing both regular RAF and political channels is self evident. As far as the RAF, Macdonald had no business discussing such matters with the Prime Minister at all. Period. Politically, Balfour should have arranged a meeting with Sinclair, the minister responsible for air matters.

In defence of Bader, the meeting was arranged in some secrecy. I have not read any account in which the author suggests that Bader knew of it. There is a good reason for this. Had Bader been aware of Macdonald's manoeuvring he would certainly have vetoed it.

[stona]

Wednesday 18 September

Generally unsettled but with bright spells.

Despite the marginal weather the Luftwaffe started early. At about 09.00 large numbers of aircraft were plotted by RDF, approaching quickly from the Pas de Calais region. In a reflection of the Luftwaffe’s new tactics these were fighter-bombers from II.(S)/LG 2, which together with JG 54 flew at high altitude towards London. Park scrambled 15 of his squadrons, but due to the speed of the raid, just 6 made contact with the enemy. Some, on seeing only fighters sought to disengage, avoiding fighter vs fighter combat. 5 of Fighter Command’s aircraft, all Spitfires, were shot down and the Luftwaffe lost 2 Bf 109s.

At 11.00 another large raid was plotted approaching the English coast. Park held back, fearing a repeat of this morning’s action, but this time the large number of fighters were covering some bombers (probably twelve He 111s from I./KG 53). Chatham and Rochester were bombed unopposed. No 46 Squadron lost three of its aircraft to Galland’s JG 26, but No 19 Squadron shot down two of the bombers as they withdrew and No 41 Squadron caught two of the Bf 109s.

A third raid arrived shortly after teatime. This time Park reacted in force with fourteen squadrons, including the Duxford Wing. He was right to do so because the raid included eighteen Ju 88s of the newly arrived II./KG 77 under Major Max Kless, with London as the target. When the Germans came in over the south of England there was thick overcast at between 5,500 and 7,000 metres. JG 51, assigned to fly close escort, lost the bombers in the clouds. Fighter Command, however, did not. As the bombers approached Gravesend Nos 92 and 302 (Polish) Squadrons made a head-on attack and then, over the Thames Estuary, all five squadrons of the Duxford Wing attacked. Nine aircraft including eight of the bombers were shot down, though the RAF pilots claimed many times that number, for the loss of just one Spitfire.

As a direct result of this debacle, Kesselring summoned his fighter commanders and, in the words of Hannes Trautloft,

“We received a hail of abuse. Kesselring now requires us to fly even closer to the bombers during our close escort missions.”

This is the first time anybody ordered the fighters to do this and it was not Goering. It may be pertinent that Kesselring, able as he undoubtedly was, had been an artillery officer. Unlike Goering, who had himself been a successful fighter pilot, he had little understanding of men like Trautloft.

At the end of the day Fighter Command had lost 12 of its fighters but with just 3 pilots killed. Half of the pilots shot down had returned to their squadrons within 24 hours. The Luftwaffe had lost 15 aircraft with more than 50 airmen killed or taken prisoner.

As usual the Luftwaffe was back tonight. An estimated 200 aircraft were operating over the South East alone. London was again the principal target though Liverpool was again heavily bombed. Bombs were reported to have fallen widely across the country, on towns on the North East Coast, the Midlands and East Anglia.

Tonight, Bomber Command again made a substantial effort. 174 bombers were dispatched, most to bomb the invasion fleets in the Channel ports, others attacked railway targets in Germany. 8 aircraft were lost, 3 Whitleys, 2 Blenheims, 2 Wellingtons and a Hampden.

[stona]

It’s not just shortcomings that kill though Alan. R. E. Lee was a consummate field commander who was inordinately successful, winning many battles from an inferior position. He was virtually deified by the men that served under him as a result, but he got plenty of them killed....

There was a suspicion voiced by some of the pilots under Bader's command after the Battle of Britain that he was prepared to get them killed in his personal quest for victories. Of course, another interpretation is that he was a very aggressive commander who simply wanted to kill Germans.
Once again, you pays your money etc.

[Guest]

https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/2018/12/28/the-big-wing-controversy-and-hugh-downings-fall-from-grace/

Very interesting article.

Like Dowdings Comments. I do not like governments they always get in my way. Great slice of dower humour.

[stona]

Again, books have been devoted to the Big Wing controversy, the feuding in the cess pool that was Air Ministry politics at the time, and the plot(s) to remove Dowding.

I'll just add this to my reply to Laurie above.

After Macdonald's visit Churchill telephoned Sinclair, basically wanting to know what was going on a Fighter Command.
Sinclair went to Duxford (NOT Bentley Priory or Uxbridge) and asked a few questions. He then sent Balfour to Duxford to carry out a fuller inquiry.
Balfour spent a few hours on November 2nd at Duxford. Duxford was the base for Nos 19 and 310 (Czech) Squadrons at the time, but Bader and No 242 flew in for the day. Balfour visited no other squadrons in 12 Group or 11 Group. He spoke at length to Bader and Stan Turner, one of Bader's Flight Commanders. The consequent report must be one of the most partisan documents written within the Air Ministry at this time. You'll have to take my word for it, but it reads as if written by Bader, whose influence as a mere S/Ldr (that's equivalent to a Major in the Army) far exceeded his rank.
Balfour's 'Duxford Memorandum' to the Secretary of State and the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Douglas) is essentially a list of unsubstantiated opinions, voiced by Bader. It did, however, tell its readers exactly what they wanted to hear. The writing was on the wall for Dowding (and Park).

The reality was that in the preceding month (October) Bader had sent up wings of three, four or five squadrons on the following days, 1,2,5,7,8,10,11,13,15,17,19,25 and 29. They failed to make a single interception on any of those patrols.

You pays your money...etc.

[Guest]

Hey thanks for that Steve very nice of you to delve.

Love & war ! Yes I had read that the big wings took such a long time to form that the Germans had already scuttled off home.
Just shows, that unlike Dowding & Park, Barder had not the in depth thinking to be a commander.

Pity they did not give Bader a Spitfire & base him in the Kent area. Kept his mind busy. Or put him in charge of the Poles :tears-of-joy:

[stona]

Bader was protected by people in high places and even Dowding acknowledged his gallantry.
In Dowding's refutation of Balfour's memorandum, which he wrote to Douglas he noted that Balfour had hoped that Bader would not be disciplined 'for having been so outspoken'. Dowding replied that Balfour, having been in the service, should have known better that to listen to Bader's accusations and put them all down on paper with the 'pious hope' that he would not get into trouble. In Dowding's view 'a good deal of the ill feeling which has been engendered in this controversy has been directly due to young Bader who, whatever his other merits, suffers from overdevelopment of the critical faculty'. It was Bader's amazing gallantry, and Leigh-Mallory that would protect him from disciplinary action.

[stona]

Thursday 19 September

High winds, heavy cloud and rain all day.

Today was another wash out with little flying by either side. This was obviously a more serious problem for the Luftwaffe. It had adapted its tactics but was unable to maintain any semblance of pressure on Fighter Command. Just 70 aircraft were estimated to have crossed the British coast. Some bombs fell in the London area and in Essex, Sussex and Wiltshire.

Despite the weather some of these aircraft were intercepted and shot down.

Fighter Command suffered no operational losses today. Lt P M Brothers, now with No 257 Squadron, who would go on to enjoy a long an illustrious career in the RAF suffered an engine failure in Hurricane V6558 and made a forced landing at Alderton near Bawdsey. He was unhurt and the aircraft ‘damaged but repairable’.

The Luftwaffe lost 7 aircraft in operations against Britain with another 8 damaged. One of these was a Ju 88 of 4(F)/121 which made a wheels up landing on Oakington aerodrome in Cambridgeshire. It had been on a reconnaissance flight but had developed engine trouble. When the crew saw British fighters climbing towards them they elected to land. The crew stated that the made a belly landing because the field was small and the Ju 88 was difficult to handle on one engine. The observer had remembered to remove the films from the aircraft’s cameras and expose them. The crew’s morale was described as ‘very high’ and they were confident that they would be rescued by the German Army in a few days. Their aircraft was recovered by the British in remarkably good condition.



The port engine was clearly stopped when the landing was made.

Pilot Uffz Hans-Jurgen Scheket and his crew would have been less optimistic about their chances of rescue had they known that today Hitler ordered that the invasion fleets should cease any further assembly and that they could be dispersed to protect them from RAF bombing, though it should be possible to re-assemble the fleets within three weeks. This really was the end of any invasion possibility for 1940, though the British did not know this.

The weather limited operations tonight, but Bomber Command sent 53 aircraft to attack the invasion ports and railway targets. The Luftwaffe also made a reduced effort, mainly against London where Whitehall was hit again. Bombs also fell on Merseyside.

Below is a copy of an instruction issued by the CO of No 49 MU Faygate to a civilian contractor for the recovery and delivery of several aircraft wrecks to his facility.



Spitfire X4034 was a 72 Squadron aircraft, shot down in flames near Hawkinge by a Bf 109 on 3 September. The pilot, P/O D F B Sheen was wounded but survived. Spitfire X4278 was a 222 Squadron aircraft, shot down by Bf 109s on 4 September. The pilot, F/O J W Cutts was killed. Hurricane P3782 was a 1 Squadron aircraft which crashed for unexplained reasons on 3 September, killing P/O R W Shaw. It was probably also shot down. There is no serial given for the others. The three identifiable aircraft, and I suspect the other three, were all total write offs which had crashed into the ground. This may explain why, though they were lost on 3 and 4 September, recovery of whatever was left was not ordered until the 19th.

[Tim Marlow]

Thanks Steve. Another good read. Interesting discussion about Badger as well. To me, he sounds more and more like Custer.....being shot down was probably the only thing that ensured he survived the war....